Equilibrium In Competitive Insurance Markets An Essay On The

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  • Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information

    Joseph E. Stiglitz; Michael Rothschild

    Title:
    Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information
    Author(s):
    Stiglitz, Joseph E.
    Rothschild, Michael
    Date:
    1976
    Type:
    Articles
    Department(s):
    Business
    Volume:
    90
    Persistent URL:
    https://doi.org/10.7916/D8P277RB
    Book/Journal Title:
    Quarterly Journal of Economics
    Abstract:
    This paper analyzes competitive markets in which the characteristics of the commodities exchanged are not fully known to at least one of the parties to the transaction and suggests that the comforting myth that serious consideration of costs of communication, imperfect knowledge, and the like complicate without informing is false. Some of the most important conclusions of economic theory are not robust to considerations of imperfect information. We are able to show that not only may a competitive equilibrium not exist, but when equilibria do exist, they may have strange properties.
    Subject(s):
    Economics
    Publisher DOI:
    https://doi.org/10.2307/1885326
    Item views
    2005
    Metadata:
    text | xml
    Suggested Citation:
    Joseph E. Stiglitz, Michael Rothschild, 1976, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, Columbia University Academic Commons, https://doi.org/10.7916/D8P277RB.

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